Although often neglected by legal and policy analysis of the Eurozone crisis, an increasingly central dimension of that crisis and its management is dramatic changes to a very broad range of social rights and entitlements. These include rights relating to work as well as rights relating to a wide range of welfare entitlements such as rights to housing, health, food and social assistance. The aim of this research project is accordingly two-fold. It analyses, firstly, what has happened to social rights in a number of the Eurozone Member States most affected by the crisis: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Secondly, it looks at the content, location and background of any fundamental rights' challenges made to crisis-imposed changes to work and welfare rights in those state.
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Although often neglected by legal and policy analysis of the Eurozone crisis, an increasingly central dimension of that crisis and its management is important, sometimes dramatic, changes to social rights and entitlements. These include rights relating to work as well as rights relating to a wide range of welfare entitlements such as housing, health, education and social assistance. At the same time, fundamental rights, including fundamental social rights, from different sources can be a means to contest the crisis-imposed changes to social rights.
The aim of this project is accordingly three-fold. It analyses, firstly, what has happened to social rights in a number of the Eurozone Member States most affected by the crisis. Secondly, it explicitly links two sometimes rather disconnected discussions of 'social rights' by looking at both labour (and employment) rights and a broader range of social rights. Thirdly, it looks at the content, location and background of any fundamental rights' challenges made to crisis-imposed changes to work and welfare rights. It is worth spending a little time explaining each of these choices more fully.
We chose a subset of EU Member States, only Eurozone states but not only Eurozone states in bailouts. Our decision to focus only on those bailout countries in the Eurozone meant leaving out of the picture the three non-eurozone countries which received loan assistance from the EU at various periods from 2008 onwards (Romania, Latvia and Hungary) although these also raise important and linked questions to those raised by the Eurozone bailouts. We focus on those Eurozone countries which have required financial assistance in the given or did they assume any role in managing or shaping the changes to social rights in the Member State (for example, for public sector workers, the Croke Park Agreement in Ireland, discussed by Anthony Kerr)?
Although the legal sources underpinning bailouts raise complex legal doubts, both as to their EU or international law pedigree and as to the legal obligations they produce, our goal here is rather to see how these sources were perceived and acted upon in bailout states.
We also decided to include two countries, Spain and Italy, which are struggling in the crisis and receiving important EU instructions with a social focus but which have not entered full loan assistance mode (although Spain has a more restricted loan assistance programme applying to its financial sector). 5 These Eurozone non-bailout states have been subject, since the crisis, to reinforced budgetary rules, reinforced
Excessive Deficit Procedures and a new Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure. In addition, as the analyses of María Luz Rodríguez and Antonio Lo Faro explore, the atypical source of secret letters from the European Central Bank to Italy and Spain in August 2011 also played an important role in public and political discussions of labour law reform. Accordingly, setting bailout and non-bailout Eurozone states alongside one 3 The Greek bailouts are the most difficult to unravel, mainly because the second bailout was required before the first one had run its course and additionally because other non-Greek Eurozone bailouts occurred. Greece I was planned to run from May 2010 until 2014 with a Eurozone contribution of €80 billion. However, first, three Eurozone countries withdrew their assistance: Slovakia from the outset and Ireland and Portugal when they too required bailouts reducing the Eurozone pot for Greece I by €2.7 billion. Cyprus subsequently withdrew as an EFSF guarantor from 29 April 2013. Second, in March 2012, the second Greek bailout was agreed of just under €110 billion (plus €34.6 billion relating to the private sector involvement deal -the Greek 'haircuts') while the non-utilised portion of Greece I was cancelled. This loan runs until 31 December 2014 (para 2(c) Schedule 1: Loan Facility: Facility Specific Terms of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between EFSF and Hellenic Republic).
another allows one to consider in what ways the social instructions contained in the various norms differ: in their content, in their intensity or in their compliance pull.
A second important feature of our research design is the adoption of a broad definition of 'social' to encompass both work and a broader range of 'social or welfare' rights to housing, health, education, income.
The crisis measures seem to demand such a broad definition. Crisis changes to work-related rights include changes to the substantive level of protection offered (such as cuts to minimum wages, public sector salaries and pensions, public sector dismissals, reduced dismissal protection and reduced young worker protection)
but also, and a central element to changes to work rights in the crisis, are changes in how those substantive protections are set, most centrally the setting of wages through collective bargaining. Changes in welfare rights include across-the-board reductions in financial benefits or benefits in kind, as well as the exclusion of categories of persons from certain social benefits (e.g. irregular migrants) and sharp reductions in funding of welfare services have led to indirect interferences with social rights. Examples include the closing of hospitals in remote areas, making urgent medical help unavailable; and the downsizing of scholarships schemes that allow access to higher education.
To facilitate linked comparisons within the broad category of social rights, we have two analyses from each State, one on welfare rights, one on work rights. For two States, an additional analysis raise questions and directions for further research looking at both work and welfare. This is the case for Portugal in the analysis contributed by Roberto Cisotta and Daniele Gallo. For Spain, Leticia Díez-Sánchez argues that emergency wrongly underpinned an unfair and undemocratic distribution of the burdens of re-adjustment.
Having mapped out the changes to social rights, broadly defined, and their links to bailout and EU macroeconomic governance sources, the third aim of this project is to consider what role, if any, fundamental rights' challenges have played. On what fundamental rights' grounds were challenges made to these changes to social rights, using which sources and before which courts or other institutions monitoring compliance with Fundamental Rights ('fundamental rights bodies')?
One goal of the expanded social definition is to explore whether fundamental rights' challenges, and those taking them, vary according to whether the rights were welfare rights or work rights. Many of the casestudies show an important focus on constitutional or fundamental rights' challenges to pay and pension cuts, the latter in particular straddling the work-welfare boundary. . This paper tries to shed some light on a number of questions, both theoretical and practical, to which those judgments give rise. It is structured as follows: in the second paragraph, the legal nature of the obligations to implement such austerity measures are analyzed; in the third paragraph, some criticisms, expressed by a part of the legal doctrine and concerning the legal reasoning of the PCT, will be presented and scrutinized. Finally, in the third paragraph, the case-law of the PCT will be analyzed in a broader perspective, taking into account its implications regarding the legal framework governing the relationships between the internal legal order and European and international law, as well as its meaning in the light of the protection of national social sovereignty.
The legal nature of the obligations contracted by Portugal and the (implicit) attempt to avoid any conflict with the European legal order
The decision regarding the financial aid for Portugal was adopted by the ECOFIN 9 The EFSF has been created by the Euro Area Member States aa a société anonyme incorporated in Luxembourg and it can provide financial aid to Euro Area Member States. On the features of the EFSM and of the EFSF and on their origins in the aftermath of the Greek crisis, see A. VITERBO, R. CISOTTA, 'La crisi della Grecia, l'attacco speculativo all'euro e le risposte dell'Unione europea', Il Diritto dell'Unione europea, 2010, p. 961 ss., especially pp. 980-988. Afterwards, the EFSF has been replaced by a permanent mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM): see the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf. The possibility to establish such a mechanism has been explicitly stated at primary law level thanks to an amendment of Article As to the subjects entrusted with the task of monitoring Portugal's compliance with the decision itself and therefore also with the MoU, the Council implementing decision makes reference only to the Commission and the ECB and not to the IMF, since only the loan granted under the EFSM -an EU law instrument -is at stake in this context. Nevertheless, conditionality terms have been set with reference to the whole lending operation -involving the EFSM, the EFSF and the IMF -, therefore the three members of the Troika actually work together and the IMF is involved in the monitoring activity on the same footing as the two EU Institutions.
The Troika 14 intervenes as a monitoring body, but it had also conducted the negotiations to finalize the various instruments of the PAEF. Once more, Portugal had to negotiate with it after the Constitutional Tribunal struck down provisions implementing obligations stemming from the PAEF.
The complex architecture set up to provide financial aid to Portugal -and the conclusion would not be substantially different for the other rescued States -is avant tout based on instruments, which, as to their In this context, one may wonder whether the two EU institutions, in particular given the involvement of the EFSM -an EU instrument, as we have seen -are effectively acting as agents of the Union. Nevertheless, despite the decision regarding the involvement of the EFSM has to be clearly adopted within the EU legal framework and according to its relevant rules, it seems more appropriate to affirm that it is not the EU that is acting within the Troika (through its institutions and alongside the IMF), but the Member States of the Euro Area, and that the Commission and the ECB are actually acting on their behalf (or on behalf of the EFSF and, in the future, on behalf of the ESM: both mechanisms can be considered independent legal subjects, however it has to be recalled that they have been established by those States and the EU once more is not formally involved). In fact, the EU has not directly concluded with Portugal any of the relevant instruments: the procedures existing under EU law to conclude international agreements have not been used and formal obstacles do exist in EU law that could not be overcome (see infra, fn 13). The only foothold of the EU is the EFSM, which is not a legal subject under international law and therefore cannot per se subscribe any of those instruments. It has been (apart the IMF) the EFSF, which has directly entered into formal agreements with Portugal: see in particular Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, cit.
What is relevant for the EU legal order here is that the Commission, in line with its general tasks, as enshrined in Article 17 TEU, should ensure the compatibility of the instruments which are negotiated and adopted in this context with EU law (this has been affirmed by the Court of Justice with reference to the activity of the ESM and should be considered true, mutatis mutandis, for the EFSF: see Pringle, cit., paras 160-165, espec. 164). legal nature, are to be qualified as international agreements (including a private contracting party, where the loans are granted by the EFSF). As just said, even the part of the loan granted under the EFSM -that is to say an EU law instrument -has to be understood as a segment of the machinery based on the PAEF and the conditionality terms are those established by the MoU and the other instruments mentioned. Therefore, the move of the Euro Area Member States aimed at rescuing Portugal is principally framed outside the EU legal order, even if links with that legal order nevertheless exist 15 . As a consequence, the obligations undertaken by Portugal respectively under international and under EU law cannot be easily separated and an action in breach of the latter -fully dependent on, and functionally linked to, the PAEF -would turn out to be, in its substance, a breach of the former. a. In particular: the MoU This conclusion cannot be called into question by the doubts raised in the legal doctrine on the binding character of the MoU 16 . It is true that the MoU seems to be presented as a gentlemen's agreement, however the legal mechanism set up to provide financial aid to Portugal has to be understood in its entirety. Two considerations can be made. First, even if it looks as though it is a kind of addendum to the (legally binding) instruments 17 , it actually sets the terms under which the various tranches of the loan can be released and this has to be considered a core point in the whole legal mechanism.
Second, one may make reference to Article 2(1) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, whereby a treaty is 'an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation'. Even if this definition is aimed at clarifying the use of terms for the purpose of the Convention, it can be accepted as a general definition which can shed some light on the understanding of the MoU. The expression 'two or more related instruments' is, first of all, to be intended as a reference to the exchange of letters, a form under which treaties are often concluded in diplomatic practice.
But other cases of 'related instruments' are also possible. Thus, our situation could be interpreted as follows:
the MoU has to be inserted in a wider legal mechanism and all the related instruments are to be considered as the 'treaty'. The MoU could appear as a non-binding instrument, but it is functionally linked to other 15 Such links are not sufficient to attract the instruments in question to the EU legal order, since the obstacle of their international legal nature cannot be overcome. This has been the choice of the Euro Area Member States and this circumstance cannot be called into question. 16 For an analysis of this problem in the Portuguese literature, see: E. Correia Baptista, 'Natureza jurídica dos memorandos com o FMI e com a União Europeia', Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, 2011, p. 477 ff. 17 In particular, the MoU is attached to the mentioned letter of intent and to the other one addressed to the Managing Director of the IMF. See supra, fn 2-4 and 6. The letter of intent sent to the Managing Director of the IMF and the annexed documents are published on the website of the IMF: https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/prt/051711.pdf.
The form (and formal presentation) of the MoU, and of the whole PAEF, simply makes amendments easier. To date there have been nine updates, see the contribution by Miguel Nogueira de Brito to this Working Paper. instruments, so that the terms laid down in it play a clearly legal role, as Portugal is obliged to respect them (to obtain the next release of the loan).
Whatever one's position on the legal value of the MoU, the essentially international nature of the obligations stemming from the whole mechanism and its absorbing character with regard to EU law obligations clearly emerges from the analysis above 18 .
This explains why the Tribunal constitucional has raised no argument related to EU law 19 . Nevertheless, it might be wondered whether this absence of references to EU law was precisely intended to avoid any direct conflict with the EU and, moreover, to avoid dealing with a clash between potentially conflicting 18 This 'escape from EU law' is due to the lack of instruments of EU law to provide financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the Euro experiencing financial troubles. This is due to two factors. First, there is an explicit prohibition, enshrined in Article 125 TFEU (no bail-out clause) for the Union and for Member States to assume the financial commitments of (another) Member State. This rule is rigidly applied only to Member States whose currency is the Euro with a view to preserving the financial stability of the Euro Area: in fact the TFEU itself (Article 143) does provide the possibility of provide financial aid to Member States with a derogation (i.e. whose currency is not the Euro). Nonetheless, after the first rescue package for Greece in May 2010, Article 125 has been (re-)interpreted, also on the basis of solid textual arguments, as a non-absolute prohibition limited only to direct commitments. Second, the Union enjoys only weak competences in the field of 'economic policy'(Chapter 1, Title VIII of the Third Part of the TFEU), while it has an exclusive competence as regards monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the Euro (Article 3(1) (c) TFEU). As results from Article 2 TFEU, the EU's economic policy competence only allows a coordination of national policies at the EU level and cannot be classified within anyone of the main categories of competences (exclusive, shared The referring court raised some doubts as to the conformity of the budget law with the principles of human rights protection under EU law and the Charter; however, according to Article 51, par. 1 of the Charter itself, it has to be respected by Member States only when implementing EU law (the same is true for general principles on the protection of fundamental rights). Moreover, the Court stresses that, according to Article 6 TEU, the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties, but it does not create new competences for the Union: by recalling this statement, the Court seems to stress once more that the EU does not enjoy any kind of competences in this area. Even if this was the real underlying intention of the Luxembourg judges, it is not clear whether it has been the referring court to fail to provide evidence of application of EU law (thus giving the European judges a chance to
Criticism of the case-law of the Portuguese Constitutional Court on Austerity Measures
The case-law of the PCT has been subjected to more specific criticism as well. In substance, there are two main critical points. The first one regards the way the equality principle has been applied: it has been argued that the Tribunal has used it as an excessively flexible tool, in order to achieve some pre-determined objectives. By so doing, the Portuguese Constitutional judges would have chosen their objectives and then found the legal reasoning suitable to achieve them a posteriori. Thus, they would have acted as a legislator.
In particular, some authors 21 have found the way the Tribunal has justified the choice of applying austerity measures only to public workers not convincing and, all in all, incorrect. For instance, with regard to the cut of the fourteenth-month salary bonus, the Tribunal first considers the situations of private and public employees as, in general, comparable 22 and it opposes the cut of the bonus only for public employees. The legal reasoning through which it achieves this result can be summarized as follows. First, the measure has not been considered arbitrary by the Tribunal, as it is functional to the pursuit of a public good. According to the authors who have criticized the Tribunal, it should have stopped here. On the contrary, the Tribunal considers that the difference in treatment of the two categories (public and private workers) has to be evaluated in the light of the 'proportional equality' principle. According to the Tribunal, the guiding parameter is the aptitude of the measure to achieve the objectives laid down in the PAEF, but this is not related to intrinsic elements of the two categories and cannot justify a greater sacrifice for public workers.
On top of that, what is decisive for the PCT is the combined effect resulting from the continuous imposition of austerity measures upon public employees. As far as the reduction for extra-time work is concerned, the Tribunal considers the two situations as not comparable, as private workers normally work for more hours. Apart from the alleged weakness of this consideration per se, the authors in question argue that the Tribunal -here as in almost all the other casesis not clearly distinguishing between the preliminary question of the comparable nature of the two situations, and the justification of a different treatment.
The second critical point 23 is not only related to the results achieved by applying the equality principle test, but involves the more general approach of the Tribunal: namely, its intrusion in an allegedly exclusive competence of the national legislator. As the legislator should be granted a particularly wide margin of discretion in economic policy choices, this approach would be inadmissible a fortiori as regards budget laws.
Moreover, one may wonder whether, as the considered budget laws implemented international obligations, the margin of intervention to be recognized the Constitutional judges had to be even narrower. By declaring some provisions unconstitutional, the Tribunal has canceled some measures agreed by the Portuguese government and the Troika to put public expenditure under control and to make Portugal able to finance its debt regularly through the markets. Therefore, the government has been forced to find new ways to make ends meet. Thus, the dictum of the Tribunal influenced the outcome of delicate political negotiations and it might be wondered whether this should be considered beyond the reach of a Constitutional Court.
It can nevertheless be noted that it is quite natural for a Constitutional Court to evaluate the reasonablenessin terms of proportionality, as well as of their suitability to achieve the pre-fixed goals -of measures adopted by a government, also if previously agreed on the international plane. Some more detailed thoughts will be presented on this issue in the following paragraph, bearing in mind that a more general question has to be answered: to whom is the PCT speaking? When pieces of national legislation are struck down, the national legislator is naturally seen as under accusation, but taking into account that those provisions where negotiated with (or imposed by) the Troika, the latter might be considered as the second addressee of the PCT decisions. Therefore, such decisions can be paradoxically regarded as aimed at protecting the national legislator, by giving back to it the power to re-decide on some critical issues, albeit under the guidance of the PCT as regards the respect of fundamental rights under the national Constitution.
Constitutional courts and economic crisis, between pseudo counter-limits and social sovereignty
As observed by Júlio Gomes and Miguel Nogueira de Brito in their contributions to this Working Paper, the PCT, in its jurisprudence on austerity measures and (lato sensu) social rights, has declared unconstitutional several provisions of LOE2012 and LOE2013 on the basis of the principle of equality, laid down in Art. 13
Const., whose corollaries -the principles of proportionality and legitimate expectation, both implied in Art.
2 Const. -were also found to be breached considering that the right to pension, although not explicitly enshrined in the Constitution, can be derived from the right to property and the right to social security, which are recognized, respectively, in Articles 62 and 63 Const. It then observed that, since the right to pension is a social right, the task of deciding whether to impose restrictions on that right falls within the wide discretion of the legislator, who must ensure that a fair balance is struck between the pensioners' interests in receiving the amount originally established and the public interest represented by the 'sustentabilidade do sistema de pensões' 26 . The Tribunal had no intention to claim for itself the power to determine the minimum content of positive benefits that the State must ensure to its citizens, i.e. the core of those rights whose protection is certainly more dependent on state resources than civil and political rights 27 . As stressed by the PCT, this determination falls within "uma maior margem . In this way, the PCT, relying on the principle of equality (and on its corollaries), seems to have urged the legislator to better exercise the competences and powers it seems to have given up in favour of international and European constraints.
The approach taken by the Tribunal seems destined to exceed national boundaries and become a tool of confrontation and fertilization amongst constitutional courts in the wake of the growing phenomenon of horizontal dialogues between national judges 34 . One of the issues that will have to be assessed in the future is to what extent the Portuguese jurisprudence may be read in the sense of constitutionalizing the principlesand the rights that derive from them 35 -which have been given primacy over international constraints and, thus, have acquired universal status -principles and rights that, as a consequence, cannot be derogated from by international law and which may apply to all EU legal systems. Therefore, we have to wait for future developments in the jurisprudence of national constitutional courts.
A closely connected issue is that of the so-called counter-limits, to be understood as national principles which must be necessarily protected and which limit the effectiveness of EU law within the national legal system. Now, it is clear, first of all, that the obligations at the core of the PCT jurisprudence do not only, and mainly, derive from EU law -as has been already highlighted supra, par. 2 -but also from international law and, secondly, that they operate with respect to provisions that, even though adopted because of external constraints, are formally internal sources of law, as is the case of LOE2012 and LOE2013. The vis expansiva of EU law, through the principle of primacy, cannot be therefore automatically transposed to the dialectical relationship between international legal order and national law. This is also the reason why the PCT did not 32 On the notion of "social sovereignty" see R. 
